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What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal 
 
by JOHN CARY SIMS* 
 
Introduction 
On December 16, 2005, The New York Times disclosed the 
existence of a secret electronic surveillance program being carried out 
by the National Security Agency (NSA) that involves warrantless 
interception of the contents of international communications engaged 
in by “United States persons” – citizens of the United States and 
aliens admitted for permanent residence.1  Although details of exactly 
what NSA is doing have not been officially disclosed, the President, 
the Attorney General, and the former director of NSA (who has now 
become the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) have all 
acknowledged that a new “Terrorist Surveillance Program” that goes 
beyond the boundaries previously respected was initiated in October 
2001.2  Even without the factual predicates that would make debate 
 
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Co-Editor-in-
Chief, Journal of National Security Law & Policy.  This article is based upon a 
presentation made at the Hastings College of the Law on March 29, 2006.  I am grateful 
for the research assistance provided by Joshua D. Moore (Pacific McGeorge Class of 
2007). 
1.  James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.  This article will not analyze another NSA program that has 
been more recently described, which consists of the analysis of large quantities of 
information about domestic telephone calls, but without acquisition by the government of 
the contents of the calls.  See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ 
Phone Calls; 3 Telecoms Help Government Collect Billions of Domestic Records, USA 
TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A.  Such data-mining raises interesting and important issues, 
but they are distinct for the most part from those addressed here.  See Letter from William 
E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Responses to Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, March 24, 2006, 
at 37 [hereinafter DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee] (“the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program is not a ‘data-mining’ program”) (emphasis in original), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf. 
2.  See, e.g., DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to 
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 25 (“The Program was first authorized and 
implemented in October 2001.”).  The Justice Department has indicated that it is not 
aware of any prior occasion, since the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
in 1978, in which authorization was given for “electronic surveillance” as defined in the 
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about the legality of the program a more illuminating and satisfying 
endeavor, there have been numerous efforts to describe and analyze 
the once-secret surveillance efforts and assess their legality.3  This 
article will provide a more detailed description than has previously 
been available of exactly what it is that NSA is doing.  Once the 
nature of the program is more clearly understood, the conclusion that 
it violates the law as it stands is unavoidable.4 
I.  Title III, Keith, and FISA 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.5 
 
 
Act without obtaining a warrant.  Id., Responses to Joint Questions from House Judiciary 
Minority Members, at 11. 
3.  For example, the Department of Justice has prepared and widely disseminated a 
42-page memorandum supporting the program.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL 
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf.  The view that the program is plainly illegal was presented in an 
answering letter signed by over a dozen distinguished law professors and former 
government officials.  Letter to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al., from Curtis 
A. Bradley, Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law, Duke University, et al., Feb. 2, 
2006, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/pdf/ second_letter.pdf. 
4.  The Senate Judiciary Committee has held a number of hearings to explore the 
program, and one possible legislative response under consideration would be to amend the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to permit court approval of surveillance programs 
designed to accomplish the purposes identified by the Bush administration as justifying the 
ongoing program, with the requirement that the ongoing program then be promptly 
submitted for review.  See S. 2453, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006) (sponsored by Sen. 
Specter, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee); Walter Pincus, Specter Offers 
Compromise on NSA Surveillance, WASH. POST, June 9, 2006, at A4 (describing a revised 
proposal introduced by Senator Specter at a meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee); 
Editorial, NSA Train Wreck; An Effort To Get NSA Surveillance Under Control Is 
Morphing into a License To Spy, WASH. POST, June 12, 2006, at A20 (“In an effort to win 
votes, Mr. Specter has turned [S. 2453] from a flawed accountability measure into one that 
rewrites the rules of domestic surveillance and gives the administration an all but blank 
check to spy.”). 
5.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that electronic eavesdropping, 
even in the absence of physical intrusion, may constitute a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.6  In recognition of the 
threat to privacy interests posed by electronic surveillance, Congress 
in 1968 enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act.7  Title III established detailed requirements for the 
issuance of federal and state warrants authorizing electronic 
intercepts, and the statute also created an elaborate system for 
keeping records of and making reports about electronic surveillance.8  
In national security matters such as those involved in the fight against 
terrorism, the federal government may at any time avail itself of the 
Title III process to obtain warrants based on a showing of probable 
cause that serious crimes have been committed or are about to be 
committed.9  However, the Executive rejects such close judicial 
supervision of national security interceptions, based on the 
contention that such limitations on the President in the intelligence 
field are inconsistent with his responsibilities for national defense and 
foreign relations.  The present controversy is only the latest chapter in 
a long-running effort by Presidents to undertake electronic 
surveillance for national security purposes without the necessity to 
obtain Title III warrants, and indeed to resist the application of any 
warrant requirement in a number of situations. 
An occasion to explore the applicability of the Title III 
restrictions on electronic surveillance to national security matters was 
presented to the Supreme Court in United States v. United States 
District Court,10 often referred to as the “Keith” case because then 
District Judge Damon J. Keith11 became the subject of an application 
for a writ of mandamus filed by the government to challenge the 
district court’s order requiring disclosure of certain electronic 
surveillance information.  The court of appeals upheld the district 
court’s ruling.  The case involved national security, since one 
 
6.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
7.  82 Stat. 213 (1968), codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
8.  Annual reports are prepared by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts for transmittal to Congress.  18 U.S.C. § 2519(3) (2000).  The most recent report 
indicates that in 2005, a total of 1,773 intercept orders were approved, of which 625 were 
issued by federal courts.  ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 WIRETAP 
REPORT 5 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap05/ contents.html. 
9.  18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000). 
10.  407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
11.  Judge Keith was later appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, where he now is a senior judge. 
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defendant was accused of bombing an office of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan,12 but the perceived 
threat did not arise from the activities of foreign powers.  The 
Attorney General described the warrantless surveillance as designed 
“to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to 
attack and subvert the existing structure of Government.”13  The 
government took the position that it was unnecessary to obtain Title 
III warrants in such domestic security cases, but the Supreme Court 
rejected its arguments and affirmed the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
The Keith decision is highly relevant to the analysis of the 
current surveillance program, but it also left a number of important 
questions unanswered.  The government relied heavily on the 
language then contained in Title III that stated that the statute should 
not “be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to 
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United 
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other 
unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the 
structure or existence of the Government.”14  Although the 
government argued that this language excepted all national security 
wiretaps from Title III, the Supreme Court concluded to the contrary 
that “Congress simply left presidential powers where it found them.”15  
The Court recognized that national security concerns raised by the 
government were serious,16 and that domestic security surveillance 
“may involve different policy and practical considerations from 
‘ordinary crime,’”17 but the Court ultimately concluded that advance 
approval of electronic surveillance by a neutral and detached judicial 
officer is required in domestic security matters.18  Even so, the Court 
made it clear that its holding applied only to domestic security 
matters, not those involving foreign intelligence: 
 
 
12.  Keith, 407 U.S. at 299, 308. 
13.  Id. at 309 (emphasis supplied by the Supreme Court in quoting the affidavit of the 
Attorney General). 
14.  Id. at 302, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3).  This language was later repealed.  Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783, 1797. 
15.  Id. at 303. 
16.  Id. at 311. 
17.  Id. at 322. 
18.  Id. at 317 (“unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to 
obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected 
speech”). 
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We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the 
issues which may be involved with respect to activities of 
foreign powers or their agents.19 
 
While disclaiming any intent to guide congressional action, the 
Supreme Court then proceeded in Keith to suggest a possible way of 
reconciling a warrant requirement with the practicalities of the 
intelligence field.  The Court observed that standards for the issuance 
of a warrant “may vary according to the governmental interest to be 
enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.”  This 
might lead Congress to conclude that new warrant requirements 
should be crafted that would be “more appropriate to domestic 
security cases,” that authorization could be given by “any member of 
a specially designated court,” and that the time and reporting 
requirements of Title III could be relaxed.20  This stunningly prescient 
(or persuasive) formulation by the Supreme Court provides the 
backbone of the legislative compromise over foreign intelligence 
surveillance that became the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 (FISA).21  Even though the rough blueprint drawn up the 
Supreme Court in Keith closely resembles the system created by 
Congress in FISA, Congress has never seen the need to override the 
holding of Keith as to domestic security cases, which remain subject to 
the restrictions of Title III. 
Between the Supreme Court’s decision in Keith and the 
enactment of FISA in 1978, Congress devoted substantial attention to 
infringements of civil liberties by agencies of the United States, 
particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and NSA.  The Watergate hearings, as well as the 
investigations of the Church Committee and the Pike Committee, 
exposed numerous abuses of power.  Most significantly for present 
purposes, the revelations covered the use of break-ins and electronic 
surveillance against United States citizens based on their exercise of 
First Amendment rights.  The exposure of NSA “watch lists” 
targeting antiwar protestors bolstered efforts to make national 
security surveillance subject to statutory standards.  Development of 
a statutory system was also stimulated by the constitutional ambiguity 
generated by Keith.  Supporters of reform hoped, and generally 
 
19.  Id. at 321-22. 
20.  Id. at 323. 
21.  Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§1801-1811 (2003 & 
Supp. 2005). 
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predicted, that when the Supreme Court was presented with a case 
involving warrantless electronic surveillance in a foreign intelligence 
matter it would conclude that it would not be consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment for the Executive to be permitted to conduct 
even national security “searches” without judicial supervision.  The 
Executive, on the other hand, took heart from Keith’s explicit 
announcement that the holding did not apply to foreign security 
cases, and the suggestion that warrants might not be needed in cases 
involving foreign powers.22  At the same time, Keith’s recital of the 
threat to personal liberties posed by allowing surveillance to be put in 
place on the basis of “unreviewed executive discretion”23 seemed to 
be as applicable to foreign intelligence wiretaps as to those directed at 
domestic security threats. 
Extensive congressional deliberation, in the shadow of the risks 
that each side saw in the potential for an ultimate Supreme Court 
decision to go against it on the central question left open in Keith, led 
to FISA.  This is not the occasion to thoroughly canvass the statute, 
but the basic approach taken in foreign intelligence cases was that 
suggested by the Court in Keith as a possible solution to the problem 
of domestic security wiretaps.  Warrants would be required, but they 
would not be Title III warrants based on probable cause that a crime 
had been committed or was imminent.  Rather, warrants would be 
justified upon a showing that there was probable cause to believe that 
the target is a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power.24  This is 
uniformly agreed to be a standard that is easier to meet than the Title 
III standard. 
Applications for FISA warrants go to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), a special court created by the statute, made 
up of eleven Article III district court judges who are designated by the 
Chief Justice of the United States to carry out the additional duties of 
judges of the FISC.25  An application for a FISA warrant is considered 
 
22.   Keith, 407 U.S. at 322 & n.20. 
23.   Id. at 317. 
24.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (2003 & Supp. 2005).  The definition of “foreign power” 
includes “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”  
Id. at § 1801(a)(4).  Eventually it was recognized that electronic surveillance might also be 
appropriate if directed at an international terrorist who is not affiliated with a foreign 
power.  This problem was addressed, despite the grammatical awkwardness, by defining 
such a lone wolf to be an “agent of a foreign power.”  Id. at § 1801(b)(1)(C). 
25.  Id. at § 1803(a).  Prior to passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, the FISC 
had seven judges. The statute also provides for a court of review, made up of three Article 
III judges designated by the Chief Justice.  Id. at § 1803(b). 
SIMSPE3 6/26/2006  1:56 PM 
Winter & Spring 2006]     WHAT NSA IS DOING . . . AND WHY IT’S ILLEGAL 107 
by a single judge, with a rotation set up to assure that a judge is always 
available in or near Washington, D.C. to consider an application that 
requires immediate attention.26  The statute requires that annual 
reports be sent to the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, although the information provided is much less detailed than 
in the reports required by Title III.27 
II.  How NSA Operates 
Those who go to the movies or read spy novels are frequently 
exposed to the hypothesis that the National Security Agency listens in 
on all private electronic communications at will, whether they are 
conducted by telephone, fax, or e-mail.  A near-omniscience is 
attributed to the organization, except for communications that are 
kept out of the air altogether, such as by being delivered in personal 
conversation, by hand, or through the mails.  One focus of concern, 
especially in Europe, has been the system code-named “Echelon,” 
which was described in a report to the European Parliament as being 
“designed to indiscriminately intercept the non-military 
communications of governments, private organizations, and 
businesses on behalf of the United States and its primary partners in 
the decades-old UKUSA signals intelligence alliance – Britain, 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.  Items of intelligence value are 
selected by computer identification of keywords provided by the 
UKUSA nations.”28 
 
26.  At least three of the judges reside within twenty miles of the District of Columbia.  
Id. at § 1803(a). 
27.  The most recent report indicates that during 2005 a total of 2,074 applications 
were made to the FISC for warrants to conduct electronic surveillance, make physical 
searches, or both.  Two applications were withdrawn before they were ruled on; 2,072 
applications were granted, with 61 of those having been the subject of substantive 
modifications by the court; no application was denied in whole or part.  Letter to J. Dennis 
Hastert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, from William E. Moschella, Assistant 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, April 28, 2006, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.html.  
28.  Jeffrey Richelson, Desperately Seeking Signals; The National Security Agency’s 
Echelon Program, BULL. ATOMIC SCI., March/April 2000 (Vol. 56, No. 02), at 47.  
Richelson persuasively demonstrates that “Echelon” is only one aspect of the NSA’s 
interception of communications, and that the innovation it represents is the large-scale 
computerized exchange among the cooperating nations of raw intercepts, as opposed to 
finished reports.  His short article also provides an excellent overview of the activities of 
NSA.  Although the agency was once so obscure that it was appropriate to joke that its 
initials were an acronym for “No Such Agency,” there is now a substantial body of 
published work about it.  See, e.g., JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF 
THE ULTRA-SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (Anchor 2002); JAMES BAMFORD, 
THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA’S MOST SECRET AGENCY (1982); 
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Even given NSA’s immense human and computer resources, 
interception and analysis of all electronic communications is not 
possible.29  A first obstacle is the immense volume of electronic 
communication, including telephones (landlines and cellular), e-mails, 
and other forms.  General Michael V. Hayden, who directed NSA for 
six years before becoming Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence, and more recently Director of the CIA, has testified that 
the “explosion in telecommunications” has brought about a situation 
in which the percentage of signals collected by NSA, relative to the 
overall volume of signals, has “never been smaller.”30   A second 
significant practical difficulty is that many communications, and 
certainly a significant percentage of those of primary interest to the 
U.S. intelligence community, are not in English, and few competent 
linguists may be available to work in the critical languages.31  Third, 
the communications may be encrypted or encoded; this is certainly 
not a new problem, but one that is exacerbated by the ready 
 
PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, CHATTER: DISPATCHES FROM THE SECRET WORLD OF 
GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING (2005); Lawrence D. Sloan, ECHELON and the Legal 
Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467 (2001). 
29.  This discussion addresses only technical feasibility.  There also are legal limits, 
which will be discussed below. 
30.  The National Security Agency: Hearing Before the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2000 (Lexis, News Library) [hereinafter Hayden 2000 
House Testimony] (testimony of Gen. Hayden); see also id. (“Our ability to collect may 
have increased, but it has increased at a pace far slower and smaller than the explosion of 
the 1s and 0s that are out there.”); JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY 
OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 48 (2006) (“Today, industry experts 
estimate that approximately 9 trillion e-mails are sent in the United States each year.  
Americans make nearly a billion cell phone calls and well over a billion landline calls each 
day.”); Richelson, supra note 28 (“The UKUSA SIGINT agencies certainly do not 
intercept every signal that passes through the airwaves.”).  SIGINT is “signals 
intelligence,” a term that was defined by General Hayden in his prepared remarks for the 
House Intelligence Committee hearings on April 12, 2000: “Signals intelligence is 
comprised of communications intelligence and electronics intelligence.  Communications 
intelligence consists of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other 
electromagnetic means and electronics intelligence consists of foreign electromagnetic 
radiations such as emissions from a radar system.”  Michael V. Hayden, Statement for the 
Record, Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 
2000, at 6 n.4, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/hayden.html.  
31.  See James Bamford, The Agency That Could Be Big Brother, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 
2005, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1: 
During the cold war, the agency could depend on a constant flow of 
American-born Russian linguists from the many universities around 
the country with Soviet studies programs.  Now the government is 
forced to search ethnic communities to find people who can speak 
Dari, Urdu or Lingala – and also pass a security clearance that frowns 
on people with relatives in their, or their parents’, former countries. 
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availability of encryption software to private individuals.32  Another 
difficulty is the “significant limit imposed on the ability to monitor 
voice communications” because of the ineffectiveness of 
computerized systems for spotting words in aural communications.33  
General Hayden has noted that this problem may not be as urgent as 
it once was, since “E-mail is a bit going back to the future, looking a 
lot more like telex, which is the roots of our organization, reading the 
printed word, rather than the recent past of our organization, which is 
dealing with the spoken word.”34  A fifth concern is that some signals 
may also be difficult for NSA to acquire, or perhaps unavailable 
altogether, because they are transmitted through fiber-optic cables 
rather than being sent through the air by microwave or satellite.35 
Despite all the difficulties faced by NSA, it remains true that 
“NSA and its allies clearly do intercept an enormous volume of 
data.”36  In testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence in 2000, General Hayden addressed concerns raised 
by the American Civil Liberties Union that NSA’s capabilities could 
be used against Americans.  His statement emphasized that there are 
“absolutely clear rules” prohibiting such practices, but went on to 
make a point that is highly pertinent in analyzing the agency’s 
 
32.  The availability of more powerful personal computers and the development of 
public key cryptography made it practicable for private parties to use effective encryption 
at low cost.  See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, The Intelligence Gap: How the Digital Age Left 
Our Spies Out in the Cold, NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 1999, at 58 (reporting that “the agency’s 
long fight against encryption delayed its widespread use by many years” but that 
“encryption could not be stopped”). 
33.  Richelson, supra note 28 (“In 1993, former NSA director Bobby Inman admitted 
that ‘I have wasted more U.S. taxpayer dollars trying to do that [word spotting in speech] 
than anything else in my intelligence career.’”).  Whatever limitations exist on the 
effectiveness of voice transcription systems would not prevent NSA from acquiring and 
recording a given telephone conversation, but the incentive to engage in any given 
surveillance program is substantially reduced if it requires a large investment of resources 
(such as the use of a linguist) to convert the content of the call into usable form.  
Richelson notes that even in the absence of effective word spotting by computers, “the 
phones of the parties involved in a call can be automatically identified and voiceprints can 
be used to identify who is speaking.”  Id.  Even if one assumes that Inman’s 1993 
statement was accurate, it remains possible that a breakthrough has been achieved since 
that time.  See BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 556 (“A recent 
breakthrough was made by biomedical engineers at the University of Southern California, 
who claim to have created the first machine system that can recognize spoken words better 
than humans can.”). 
34.  Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30. 
35.  Richelson, supra note 28. 
36.  Id. 
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technological limitations as well as the legal constraints under which it 
operates.  He stated: 
 
There is a powerful element of truth in the ACLU text, 
okay.  And that talks about opportunity or capability.  
For us to do our mission in today’s telecommunications 
world requires a substantial amount of capability, okay. 
It’s theoretically possible for us to use that capability – 
technologically possible to use that capability in ways that 
are prohibited.  Of course I have to answer yes.37 
 
All informed observers agree that the ability of NSA to intercept 
electronic communications is very large, even if it is not effectively 
unlimited, as is sometimes alleged.  Thus, in exploring the legal issues 
raised by the recent NSA electronic surveillance program, it is 
prudent to assume that almost any electronic communication that is 
sent through the air can be acquired by NSA if it is deemed to be 
worth the effort.38 
That brings us to the aspect of its operations that NSA guards 
most closely.  Since it has the technical capacity to intercept a large 
percentage of the electronic communications that flood the modern 
world,39 but it cannot with the available personnel and other resources 
intercept and analyze all of them, it must set priorities.  Day in and 
 
37.   Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30. 
38. NSA’s access to communications transmitted on fiber-optic cables remains 
unknown, but it has recently been alleged that it taps into the cables “by using specially 
designed submarines, such as the USS Jimmy Carter, to attach a complex ‘bug’ to the cable 
itself.”  James Bamford, Big Brother Is Listening, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 2006, at 65, 
68; see KEEFE, supra note 28, at 73-75.  It has also been alleged that NSA has been granted 
direct access to the networks of telecommunications carriers, making it unnecessary to 
seek to obtain signals from fiber-optic cables.  See, e.g., id. at 68 (stating that fiber-optic 
cables entering the United States from Europe and Asia are tapped at the landing stations 
where they come ashore); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data 
Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, December 24, 2005, at A1 (reporting that NSA “has 
gained the cooperation of American telecommunications companies to obtain backdoor 
access to streams of domestic and international communications” and that the agency has 
“in the last few years been quietly encouraging the telecommunications industry to 
increase the amount of international traffic that is routed through American-based 
switches”).  Communications sent by fiber-optic cables would also be vulnerable to 
interception if sent through the air at any point in their path from sender to recipient.   
39. The degree of success that NSA achieves in its efforts to keep up with the ever-
growing flood of electronic communications is disputed.  Compare note 30 supra and 
accompanying text and Hersh, supra note 32, with Bamford, supra note 38, at 70 (stating 
that NSA personnel “are close to achieving” their “ultimate goal of intercepting and 
reviewing every syllable and murmur zapping into, out of, or through the United States”). 
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day out, NSA must make decisions about what communications it will 
intercept, which ones it will store for future reference, which ones it 
will subject to preliminary screening by computers, which ones will be 
routed for inspection by a human analyst, and ultimately which ones 
will be given a full analysis that will be transmitted to its “customers” 
in the intelligence community, including the President.  As General 
Hayden has stated, “there is a great demand that we focus what it is 
that we can work against on the highest-priority legitimate foreign 
intelligence targets we have.”40  Plainly, the effectiveness of NSA’s 
efforts could be greatly diminished if it were known what channels of 
communications it is intercepting, or which ones it places special 
emphasis on, or for that matter which ones it has decided are not 
worth the effort to intercept and analyze.  Those who wished to avoid 
detection would choose modes or channels of communication that are 
not monitored, or that receive low emphasis from NSA.  On the other 
hand, one hostile to the United States who knows that a given 
channel is being closely monitored may deliberately transmit false 
information or otherwise act to manipulate U.S. responses.41 
The setting and implementation of priorities is at the very heart 
of what NSA does.  It can focus on particular modes or channels of 
communication, particular locations, particular phone numbers or e-
mail addresses, characteristics of the communication (e.g. length, 
language, use of encryption), and content, such as particular names, 
words, phone numbers, or combinations of these.42  No doubt 
 
40.   Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30. 
41.  There is no limit to the permutations that are possible.  James Bamford had 
reported that (at least as of the time he collected information for his most recent book) 
“NSA regularly listens to unencrypted calls from suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden, in 
hiding in Afghanistan,” that bin Laden “is aware that the United States can eavesdrop on 
his international communications, but he does not seem to care,” and that NSA analysts 
“play audiotapes of Bin Laden talking to his mother” in order to impress visitors.  
BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 410.  In the Afterword to the paperback 
edition of the book, Bamford states that bin Laden changed tactics in 1998 after “an 
American missile attack on his compound in Afghanistan made him think twice about 
using satellite communications.”  Id. at 614.  He alleges that since that time bin Laden has 
communicated through messengers who make calls for him, and that even so NSA 
intercepted a call in early September 2001 from a bin Laden associate to bin Laden’s wife, 
urging her to return to Afghanistan from Syria.  Id. at 616-17.  Bamford indicates that the 
call “was filed away” without its significance being recognized.  Id. at 617. 
42.  Jeffrey Richelson reports that, at least in the context of the discussion of the 
“Echelon” program, screening of content is accomplished through the use of 
“dictionaries” of keywords.  Richelson, supra note 28.  A simple version of keyword 
screening would be compilation of a “watch list” like those used by NSA in the programs 
investigated by the Church Committee, in which communications by, to, or about certain 
individuals were targeted.  James Bamford contends that a computer, codenamed 
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communications between Russia and the Russian embassy in 
Washington have long been the target of intense focus by NSA.  
Thus, an effort might well be made to acquire and store every 
possible communication, even those that are encrypted at a high level.  
After 9/11, there can be no doubt about the fact that communications 
between the United States and such nations as Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have been very high on NSA’s list of 
priorities.  It may well be that all accessible international phone calls 
and e-mails are screened to some extent, but it would seem plausible 
that calls between England and France would receive less emphasis 
than those between Afghanistan and Europe, or calls within the 
Middle East.  NSA no doubt can acquire radio communications by 
taxicabs around the world, but whether it wants to do so absent a 
specific reason is another matter.  NSA has an enormous appetite for 
electronic transmissions, but it still must make choices rather than 
ordering everything on the menu.  Although the transcription of this 
testimony by General Hayden is a bit garbled, he captures the essence 
of the difficult task that NSA is attempting to carry out as it processes 
the messages that it has intercepted: 
 
We collect far more information than we process, analyze 
far more – process more than we analyze and report less 
than we – it’s a funnel, and it narrows.  And [an intercept] 
may never come to our attention, and be shunted off and 
destroyed in that sense, without the intervention of any 
of our operators.43 
 
An additional window into NSA’s processing of the flood of 
signals it intercepts was provided by an incident that began on 
 
Dictionary, searches for “keywords, names, phrases, telephone and fax numbers.”  
BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 409.  The basics of the screening process 
can easily be imagined by one familiar with the Lexis and Westlaw legal research systems, 
or even with the broad searching possible through Google. 
43.  Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30 (emphasis added).  General Hayden 
was responding to a question about what would happen to an intercept containing 
“inadvertent information on an American,” but his description of how intercepts are 
processed appears to be generally applicable.  One of General Hayden’s predecessors as 
director of NSA described a collection system that generated a million inputs per hour, 
with the following results: “filters throw away all but 6,500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet 
forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are normally selected by analysts and only one report is 
produced.”  Sloan, supra note 28, at 1480 (quoting a 1992 speech by Vice Admiral William 
Studeman). 
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January 24, 2000, when NSA’s computer system crashed.44  General 
Hayden described the problem and NSA’s recovery from it in his 
congressional testimony: 
 
[I]t’s been in the press, about the outage at NSA in late 
January.  You know, a serious matter in which we have 
already stated publicly for three and a half days we could 
not process information. 
 
But I’ve also stated publicly the collection systems 
continued, and that we had the ability to store that which 
we collected over this three and a half day period.  And 
that when we then were able to go back and process the 
information when that capability came back, it took eight 
to 12 hours to process and analyze the information that 
we had collected and life got closely – in a close sense, 
back to normal.45 
 
NSA’s mission, activities, resources, and culture are central 
elements in the current controversy over warrantless surveillance of 
the international electronic communications of United States persons 
who are within the United States.  The capacity of the agency to 
intercept such communications is very broad, but the flow of data is 
also enormous because of recent advances in communications.  The 
key to success is for NSA to tailor its targeting priorities to the needs 
of the intelligence community, while keeping those priorities secret 
from the targets and dealing with any technical problems that might 
impair access to the desired signals.  Patrick Radden Keefe has aptly 
described “the intelligence cycle” that governs the work of NSA and 
other agencies: 
 
The cycle starts with planning and target selection, which 
then leads naturally to collection of raw intelligence.  
Next, the collected intelligence goes through processing, 
then analysis and production of finished intelligence 
 
44.  See BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 451-54. 
45.  Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30; see KEEFE, supra note 28, at 109-10; 
BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 454 (reporting that, during the outage, 
much of the intercept traffic that would have normally gone to NSA was directed instead 
to the agency’s British counterpart, GCHQ). 
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reports, and ultimately distribution to interested parties, 
before starting back at the planning stage again.46 
 
While Keefe is describing the process in terms applicable to any 
intelligence agency, it accurately describes what NSA does in 
intercepting communications and then processing and analyzing them 
in order to produce finished reports for distribution.  The one 
additional aspect of NSA’s work that needs to be described in order 
to permit an appropriate analysis of the warrantless surveillance 
program is the legal framework within which NSA operates. 
 
III.  How Did NSA Handle Information About U.S. Persons Before 
    the New Warrantless Surveillance Program Was Put in Place? 
 
The central component of the intricate system created by FISA 
to regulate electronic surveillance is the concept of “agent of a 
foreign power.”  The FISC judge to whom an application is made 
cannot issue a FISA warrant unless, in addition to finding that all the 
other requirements of the statute have been complied with, the judge 
finds that 
 
on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant there is 
probable cause to believe that – 
 
(A)  the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power . . . and 
 
(B)  each of the facilities or places at which the electronic 
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, 
by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power . . . .47 
 
 
46.  KEEFE, supra note 28, at 109-10. 
47.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(3) (2003 & Supp. 2005).  There are many details in FISA 
that do not call for discussion here.  However, it is worth noting that the Attorney General 
may authorize certain electronic surveillance without the need to seek a FISA warrant, 
primarily when the target is an embassy or similar facility of a foreign nation.  Id. at § 
1802.  In addition, the language of section 1805(a)(3)(A) quoted in the text omits an 
important proviso designed to guard against abuses of the sort that NSA had committed in 
the past: “Provided, That no United States person may be considered a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 
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Much turns, then, on the statutory definition of “an agent of a 
foreign power,” since no individual may be subjected to electronic 
surveillance that requires a FISA warrant unless there is probable 
cause to believe that the person is such an agent.  The statutory 
definition is itself complex, but for present purposes it is only 
necessary to explore when a United States person is considered an 
agent of a foreign power.48  An individual is a “United States person” 
if a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.49  A 
United States person is an agent of a foreign power if he or she 
“knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for 
or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may 
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States,”50 or 
if he or she “knowingly” engages in similar activities that are 
obviously inimical to the interests of the United States.51  For 
purposes of our discussion here, let us assume that the potential 
subject of electronic surveillance is a United States person who could 
potentially fall within the quoted portion of the definition. 
Before we plunge more deeply into how the warrantless 
electronic surveillance program should be analyzed as applied to the 
United States person described above, it will be useful to identify a 
number of situations that plainly do not fall within the scope of the 
program as it has been described to the public.  For purposes of this 
discussion, let us assume that the communications in question take 
place “under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law 
 
48.  The standard for so labeling those who are not United States persons is more 
expansive.  Id. at § 1801(b)(1).  Any person, whether or not a United States person, is an 
agent of a foreign power if he or she meets the narrower definition applicable to United 
States persons.  See id. at § 1801(b)(2). 
49.   Id. at § 1801(i).  The definition also describes when an unincorporated association 
or a corporation is a United States person. 
50.   Id. at § 1801(b)(2)(A). 
51.  Id. at § 1801(b)(2)(B)–(E).  These additional categories of agents of foreign 
powers include those who knowingly engage in certain clandestine intelligence activities at 
the direction of and on behalf of a foreign power; knowingly engage in sabotage or 
international terrorism or preparation therefore; knowingly use a false identity on behalf 
of a foreign power; or knowingly aid or abet, or conspire to engage in, the activities 
described in the first three parts of the definition.  General Hayden succinctly summarized 
the complex statutory definition: “a judge may determine a U.S. person to be an agent of a 
foreign power only if there is information to support a finding that the individual is a spy, 
terrorist, saboteur, or someone who aids or abets them.”  Hayden, Statement for the 
Record, supra note 30, at 3. 
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enforcement purposes.”52  This discussion will be limited to situations 
that do not fall within any of the following categories: 
 
  A Title III warrant has been issued.53 
 
  A FISA warrant has been issued.54 
 
  The United States person in question is outside the United States.55 
 
  The government does not intend to intercept the contents of the 
 communication.56 
 
  The interception occurs within the United States.57 
 
 
52.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1), (3)–(4).  This is certainly an appropriate assumption for 
telephone calls, faxes, and e-mails. 
53.  The essence of the FISA legislative compromise was to give the government a way 
to obtain a warrant for electronic surveillance that did not require meeting the probable 
cause standard applied in ordinary criminal cases.  Therefore, in the hypothetical situation 
described in the text the government would not choose to take upon itself the higher 
burden of seeking a Title III warrant. 
54.  The current controversy has arisen precisely because the government has chosen 
not to seek FISA warrants.  If FISA warrants were sought, some might be denied.  Most, 
but not all, applications for FISA warrants have been granted. 
55.  United States persons who are outside the United States were explicitly excluded 
from the reach of FISA.  See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1) (defining “electronic 
surveillance” as the acquisition of the contents of certain communications to or from “a 
particular, known United States person who is in the United States”).  At the time FISA 
was adopted, a number of those involved in the deliberations stated that additional 
legislation would be crafted to deal specifically with United States persons outside the 
United States, see, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the S. Comm. on Intelligence, 
95th Cong. 39 (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell) (“The next item of priority is 
electronic surveillance of Americans overseas.  We’ve agreed to do that next.”), but no 
such legislation has ever been adopted.  Executive Order 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 
4, 1981), requires approval from the Attorney General before NSA interception can be 
targeted against United States persons outside the United States.  Id. at § 2.5. 
56.  The statutory definition of “electronic surveillance” includes only the acquisition 
“of the contents” of a wire or radio communication.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1)–(3). 
57.  Acquisition of wire communications to or from a person in the United States, 
when the interception occurs in the United States,  is included in the definition of 
“electronic surveillance,” and thus requires a warrant, unless a party to the communication 
has given consent.  There is a narrow exception applicable to communications of computer 
trespassers.  Id. at § 1801(f)(2), referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).  
Radio communications are included in “electronic surveillance” when “both the sender 
and all intended recipients are located within the United States.”  50 U.S.C.A. § 
1801(f)(3). 
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The hub of the current controversy, then, is the subpart of the 
FISA definition of “electronic surveillance” that addresses the 
following situation: 
 
the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio 
communication sent by or intended to be received by a 
particular, known United States person who is in the 
United States, if the contents are acquired by 
intentionally targeting that United States person, under 
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required 
for law enforcement purposes . . . .58 
 
The warrantless surveillance program involves the acquisition by 
NSA of the contents of international calls involving a United States 
person who is within the United States, without issuance of a warrant.  
FISA allows calls in this category to be intercepted only if they are 
not “acquired by intentionally targeting” a “particular, known United 
States person” who is either the sender or an intended recipient of the 
communication. 
Before discussing the legality of the warrantless surveillance 
included in the current program, it would be useful to describe how 
NSA has traditionally dealt with international electronic 
communications that include information about a United States 
person.  General Hayden’s testimony in 2000 before the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is highly illuminating on 
this issue: 
 
There are other circumstances envisaged by the 
legislation, by the FISA act, that from time to time we 
will unintentionally acquire information to, from or about 
U.S. persons. . . .  Under the statute, I may retain and 
disseminate information unintentionally acquired to, 
from or about American persons only if the information 
is necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence 
information.  What do we need [sic] by “to or from” 
American persons?  I’ll give you an example there.  
We’ve got someone outside the United States speaking a 
 
58.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1). 
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foreign language, engaged in a terrorist plot, terrorist 
activities, and only later in subsequent conversations do 
we find revealed in such conversations that that person 
has an American identity – he carries an American 
passport or she has an American green card.  This is 
information incidentally unintentionally acquired about 
an American person.  The information acquired up to 
that point can be used in accordance with the FISA 
statute if it is necessary to understand or assess foreign 
intelligence information.  I cannot continue to target that 
person without going through the processes I’ve 
described to you earlier.59 
 
General Hayden described a communication involving a United 
States person outside the United States.  No FISA warrant would be 
required even if the United States person were within the United 
States, unless the interception targeted the United States person.  Let 
us focus on calls somehow selected by NSA for interception overseas 
on a basis other than participation in the call of a United States 
person who is within the United States.  Perhaps calls are made from 
Afghanistan, and NSA is intercepting all electronic communications 
between the United States and Afghanistan.  Calls may be made from 
a phone number in Afghanistan known to be used by terrorists, and 
therefore targeted by NSA.  It may be the time, or duration, or the 
subject matter of the calls that leads to their interception, and that 
focuses NSA’s attention on a United States person within the United 
States.  There is no problem with the initial interceptions, since we 
are assuming they were not acquired by intentionally targeting the 
United States person. 
Can the United States person who is now of interest be added to 
a watch list or dictionary so that any future international calls to or 
from him will be intercepted?  The answer is “no,” since taking that 
step would be intentionally targeting a United States person within 
the United States.  Of course, that would not really be a problem 
under the facts described by General Hayden, even for a United 
States person within the United States, since the contents of the calls 
already intercepted would clearly establish that the United States 
person is an agent of a foreign power.  Thus, the FISC would 
 
59.  Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30.  Earlier in his testimony, General 
Hayden had described the FISA warrant process.  See also supra note 55 (discussing the 
treatment of United States persons who are outside the United States). 
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unquestionably grant a warrant upon request, permitting complete 
coverage of the target’s international and domestic electronic 
communications.60 
What about use and retention of the communications already 
intercepted, particularly if the situation is not a clear-cut one in which 
the government will obtain a FISA warrant?  As described by 
General Hayden, NSA has quite elaborate procedures designed to 
minimize the intrusion on the privacy interests of United States 
persons as to whom information is incidentally acquired by NSA.61  
Under most circumstances, the identity of a United States person will 
be deleted from the intelligence reports circulated by NSA, with the 
name replaced by “U.S. Person.”  However, the protection for 
privacy is substantially less than it at first appears.  If one of the 
intelligence agencies receiving a report requests the identity, NSA 
will provide the information if it is determined to be necessary to 
understand the foreign intelligence information or assess its 
importance.62 
General Hayden stated that “from time to time [NSA] will 
unintentionally acquire information to, from or about U.S. persons.”63  
This suggests that unintentional collection of such information about 
United States persons is not a serious problem, especially in light of 
NSA’s restrictions on the retention and dissemination of the 
identifying information unless it is needed to understand or assess the 
intercepted communication.  Such an understanding would, however, 
 
60.  Once the FISA probable cause standard is met, the government can even get 
warrants going beyond electronic intercepts, such as for audio or video surveillance or for 
physical searches. 
61.  The detailed NSA manual that regulates the collection, processing, retention, and 
dissemination of electronic communications to, from, or about United States persons has 
been released to the public, although with significant redactions.  NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, UNITED STATES SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE 
DIRECTIVE 18, LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, July 27, 1993 
[hereinafter USSID 18], available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB23/07-01.htm.  USSID 18 is supplemented by a detailed manual further 
regulating the handling of information about United States persons.  The version that has 
been released is riddled with deletions.  NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL 
SECURITY SERVICE, U.S. IDENTITIES IN SIGINT, March 1994, available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/16-01.htm.  
62.  See USSID 18, supra note 61, at § 7.2(c); BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra 
note 28, at 448 (“Although NSA takes great pains to eliminate the names of U.S. persons 
in the reports it sends out, any customer (for instance, CIA or DIA) can obtain the names 
simply by faxing a request to NSA.  The request must offer a reason and state that the 
name ‘is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or assess its importance.’”).  See 
generally id. at 441-49. 
63.  Hayden 2000 House Testimony, supra note 30. 
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fail to appreciate the significance of the way in which NSA goes about 
collecting communications.  While some interceptions are narrowly 
targeted on particular phone numbers or specific individuals, in other 
instances NSA picks up all or a significant portion of the 
communications on certain communications channels or in certain 
locations.  For example, under current circumstances it must be 
assumed that NSA is very aggressive in seeking to acquire 
international communications going into or coming out of Iran.64  
Therefore, NSA’s processing of the calls inevitably will turn up 
information about United States persons in the United States 
(perhaps those with relatives in Iran) who have been involved in or 
mentioned in communications that were intercepted.  NSA has never 
disclosed how frequent such “unintentional” acquisition of 
information about United States persons is, and outsiders are not well 
placed to make a quantitative estimate, but it seems clear that such 
interceptions are frequent and growing.  James Bamford, an 
acknowledged expert on NSA and the author of two books about the 
agency, has observed: 
 
The deliberate targeting of Americans is only one issue.  
The other is what is done when an American – or a 
citizen of one of the other UKUSA nations – incidentally 
turns up in the reams of intercepted traffic.  This is 
becoming more and more likely as technology advances.  
“The networks have collapsed into one another,” said 
one senior NSA official, “and many of our targets are on 
the same network that we use.  It is just ‘the network’ – 
the global telecommunications infrastructure.”65 
 
It turns out that communications that are “unintentionally” or 
“incidentally” acquired by NSA because they were not targeted may 
 
64.  The agency is certainly intercepting communications within Iran as well, but that 
does not raise issues under FISA, since neither end of the call would involve a United 
States person in the United States. 
65.  BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS, supra note 28, at 441-42.  Admiral Hayden was 
interviewed extensively by Bamford in the preparation of the book.  Bamford provides 
one dramatic example of an incident in which interception not targeted at a United States 
person nonetheless produced highly personal information about him.  “In 1980, while 
intercepting everything in and out of Libya, NSA analysts discovered that President 
Jimmy Carter’s brother Billy was doing business with and acting as an unregistered agent 
of the Libyan government.”  Id. at 443. 
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constitute a very significant proportion of the communications that 
are intercepted: 
 
A large volume of information flowing through the same 
signal increases the likelihood that incidental information 
will be collected.  In addition, the fact that many different 
types of communications flow over the same media 
results in increased incidental interceptions unrelated to 
the target of the surveillance.  Modern communication 
satellites are capable of carrying various forms of 
communication, including television, telephone, and data.  
Governmental communications often travel over the 
same signals as private communications, creating a 
situation in which an innocent man’s telephone call to his 
wife can be transmitted over the same signal as a report 
from the Chinese embassy to Beijing.  Given these 
developments in the field of COMINT collection and 
communication technology, this exception for 
incidentally acquired information threatens to swallow 
the entire rule.66 
 
IV.  How Does the Warrantless Surveillance Program Handle 
“Unintentionally” Collected Information  
About United States Persons? 
 
The warrantless surveillance program appears to significantly 
expand the interception of international electronic communications 
involving United States persons by taking “unintentionally” 
intercepted communications to, from, or about an individual, and 
using them as a basis for targeting future communications involving 
that person.67  As discussed above, General Hayden’s original 
 
66.  Sloan, supra note 28, at 1503-04.  For a definition of Comint, see supra note 30. 
Although the focus on governmental communications may be less intense now than it was 
prior to 9/11, as terrorist groups like al Qaeda have become more urgent targets, the point 
that Sloan is making remains valid.  The same circuits that carry the communications of al 
Qaeda adherents in Afghanistan or Pakistan also carry communications from many other 
individuals and organizations.  If NSA chooses to intercept the entire stream of 
communications over the circuit, in order to make sure that the al Qaeda messages being 
sought are captured, then the large volume of messages involving others are considered 
incidentally intercepted. 
67.  Since the operational details of the program have not been disclosed, it is possible 
that it goes further.  Thus, the United States persons whose international calls are targeted 
by NSA may include not only those who send, receive, or are mentioned in intercepted 
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scenario, in which interceptions not targeted on a United States 
person provided convincing evidence that he is an agent of a foreign 
power, presents no challenge.  In that case, the government could use 
the intercepted communications to obtain a FISA warrant covering 
all electronic communications to or from that person.  But what if a 
suspected terrorist in Pakistan calls a United States person in the 
United States, the call is intercepted and analyzed upon criteria that 
have nothing to do with the United States person, and upon 
examination its contents appear completely innocuous?  Analysts 
might feel that the very fact that the suspected terrorist called the 
United States person raises suspicions about the United States 
person, perhaps even strong ones.  This situation, however, would 
probably not be enough to secure issuance of a FISA warrant, since 
the apparently innocuous phone call would not provide probable 
cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a foreign 
power.  What if a second communication (assuming once again that it 
is intercepted without targeting the United States person) passes 
between the two individuals?  An active dialogue between the 
suspected terrorist and the U.S. person, even if the contents of the 
communications appear innocent, might well at some point provide 
the probable cause needed for issuance of a FISA warrant, but it 
would not necessarily be easy to say when the tipping point would be 
reached. 
The information that is publicly available strongly suggests that 
these are the types of situations in which the Administration’s 
surveillance program calls for targeting the United States person 
without a warrant.  The Administration has stated that what it labels 
the Terrorist Surveillance Program “is narrowly tailored to target 
only communications where one party is outside the United States 
and there are reasonable grounds to believe that at least one party is 
a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist 
organization.”68  Of course in any such a situation it would be possible 
to seek a FISA warrant, but the essence of the program is the decision 
to forgo that approach in favor of warrantless surveillance.  The 
 
international communications involving someone connected to al Qaeda, but may extend 
as well to those who are in contact with those who have been in touch with someone 
connected to al Qaeda.  See generally Seymour M. Hersh, Listening In, NEW YORKER, 
May 29, 2006, at 25 (describing the use of the technique of “chaining” to identify 
additional individuals who are considered to be of interest, based on their contacts with 
others who have already come to the attention of NSA). 
68.  DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to 
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 7. 
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Administration has not been entirely clear in explaining why it 
considers the FISA process inadequate, but two possibilities readily 
suggest themselves: (1) Under the program, NSA is using a standard 
for probable cause that is easier to meet than the one that would be 
applied by the FISC; or (2) The same standard is being used for 
probable cause, but the resources needed to prepare applications, 
along with the delays and risks of using the formal FISA process, are 
considered unacceptable. 
The probable cause standard being used in the program, and the 
significance of any delays that would result if FISA were used, will be 
discussed below.  However, before proceeding to address those issues 
it is worthwhile to summarize the apparent differences between the 
current warrantless surveillance program and the NSA intercept 
programs that were in place before 9/11.  As described above, FISA 
does not flatly prevent NSA from intercepting, processing, analyzing, 
and distributing international communications by, from, or about 
United States persons in the United States.  Many such 
communications may come to the agency’s attention as it intercepts 
broad categories of communications, or because United States 
persons are in contact with suspected terrorists overseas.  There are 
some limits on the retention and distribution of such unintentionally 
acquired information about United States persons, but the 
information can be used if it is needed to help analysts understand the 
communications.  When interception takes place outside the United 
States, FISA regulates the targeting of communications to or from a 
particular United States person in the United States.69  That requires a 
FISA warrant based on probable cause.  What concerns the agency is 
that without targeting the suspected United States person it will not 
acquire all international communications that are potentially relevant, 
only those that are intercepted using some criterion or criteria other 
than the identity of the United States person.  The warrantless 
 
69.  FISA requires a warrant before international electronic communications of 
United   States persons within the United States are targeted.  What is often overlooked is 
that a warrant is not required when those communications are acquired overseas through 
interception that targets someone else.  For example, Judge Richard A. Posner recently 
analyzed a hypothetical in which a suspected terrorist in a foreign country is calling 
someone in the United States.  Richard A. Posner, Wire Trap: What if Wiretapping 
Works?, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 2006, at 15.  Judge Posner states that a warrant is needed 
if “the party on the U.S. side of the conversation is a ‘U.S. person.’”  To the contrary, no 
warrant is needed if the target of the interception is the suspected terrorist overseas, or if 
the acquisition is done on any basis other than “by intentionally targeting” a United States 
person. Thus, as described supra in the text accompanying notes 47-66, FISA is not as 
restrictive as is sometimes assumed. 
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surveillance program is based on the fear that some relevant 
communications may slip through the cracks, in a situation in which 
the government either cannot get a FISA warrant or is unwilling to do 
so.  Warrantless surveillance may also be an easier and cheaper way 
to screen possible terrorists than using other investigative techniques. 
When the government makes the choice between getting a FISA 
warrant or choosing not to do so, it does so in the shadow of FISA’s 
criminal sanction:  “A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally 
. . . engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as 
authorized by statute    . . . .”70  Title III dovetails with FISA by 
imposing criminal liability on one who, except “as otherwise 
specifically provided” in Title III: 
 
intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or 
procures any other person to intercept or 
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic 
communication  . . . .71 
 
Finally, Title III provides: 
 
. . . [the] procedures in this chapter72 or chapter 12173 and 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be 
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as 
defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of 
domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may 
be conducted.74 
 
The argument up to this point has established that the 
warrantless surveillance program involves “electronic surveillance” 
regulated by FISA because international calls of United States 
persons within the United States “are acquired by intentionally 
 
70.  50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000).  A violation “is punishable by a fine of not more 
than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.”  Id. at § 1809(c). 
71.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(1)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006).  In most situations, violations may 
be punished by a prison term of up to five years.  Id. at § 2511(4)(a). 
72.  The reference is to Title III, which has been codified as Chapter 119 of Title 18 of 
the United States Code. 
73.  The reference is to Chapter 121 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2701-2712 (2000 & Supp. 2006), which addresses issues relating to the disclosure of the 
contents of electronic communications that have been stored on an electronic 
communications system. 
74.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
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targeting” those United States persons.75  Neither of the relevant 
mechanisms for obtaining warrants – under FISA for electronic 
surveillance or under Title III for all electronic communications – has 
been utilized.  Further, the statutory language quoted above makes it 
clear that in the absence of a warrant such electronic surveillance is a 
crime unless it is “authorized by statute.”  Therefore, the warrantless 
surveillance program violates the applicable statutes, and the 
interceptions being carried out are federal crimes. 
The Administration has somewhat indirectly confirmed that its 
program does indeed fail to comply with the procedures set out in 
FISA, although it has apparently never explicitly confirmed that the 
problem arises specifically from the “targeting” of the 
communications of United States persons.  Even in recognizing the 
conflict between the warrantless surveillance program and FISA, the 
Administration has not exactly conceded that it has departed from 
the FISA procedures: 
 
[W]e note that the [Justice] Department’s legal analysis 
assumes, solely for purposes of that analysis, that the 
targeted interception of international communications 
authorized under the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
would constitute “electronic surveillance” as defined by 
FISA.  As noted in our January 19th paper, we cannot 
confirm whether that is actually the case without 
disclosing sensitive classified information.76 
 
Despite the caution displayed by the Justice Department’s 
formulation, no doubt remains about the departure from FISA’s 
procedures, and the use of the word “targeted” may also tend to 
confirm that the fundamental legal difficulty with the program is that 
it targets United States persons whose international communications 
would otherwise be subject to interception only on the basis of some 
other criterion or criteria. 
Of course the Administration, even though forced to 
acknowledge the existence of the warrantless surveillance program 
 
75.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2005). 
76.  DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to 
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 12; see id., Responses to Joint Questions from 
House Judiciary Minority Members, at 10 (identical wording, except that the definition of 
electronic surveillance is described as being “in” FISA).  The legal analysis that the quote 
refers to is that presented in the DOJ memorandum that is cited supra note 3. 
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and unable to reconcile it with FISA’s procedures, has in no way 
conceded that the program is illegal, and in fact it has mounted an 
aggressive defense.  The two theories upon which the Administration 
attempts to bring the program into line with FISA are these: 
 
   The warrantless surveillance program was “authorized by statute” 
when Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force (“AUMF”) shortly after 9/11. 
 
   If the AUMF is not accepted as authorizing the program, it is 
unconstitutional for FISA to prohibit the warrantless surveillance 
program, since this intrudes on the inherent constitutional 
authority of the President. 
 
This is not the occasion to undertake a detailed analysis of the 
constitutional issues raised by these defenses of the warrantless 
surveillance program.  Indeed, it may well be that a satisfactory and 
complete analysis of those issues must await the disclosure of 
additional information about the program and the way in which it is 
being carried out.  However, even a preliminary analysis of these 
arguments demonstrates that they provide very slender reeds to 
support the program. 
 
V.  The AUMF Does Not Authorize the Warrantless  
Surveillance Program 
 
Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(the “AUMF”) on September 14, 2001, and it became law when 
President Bush signed it on September 18, 2001.77  The legislation 
authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of 
September 11, 2001, or those who harbored those responsible for the 
attacks.  In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated that the AUMF “is the 
kind of congressional action the FISA law anticipated.”78 
 
77.   Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
78. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance 
Authority: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, February 6, 2006 (morning 
session) (Lexis, News Library) [hereinafter Feb. 6, 2006 Judiciary Committee Hearing] 
(testimony of Attorney General Gonzales). 
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The Administration sees the current dispute as essentially a 
rerun of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,79 the case involving a man who had been 
born in the United States (and thus was a U.S. citizen), though his 
parents had returned to their native Saudi Arabia with Hamdi while 
he was still a young boy.  Late in 2001, he was seized in Afghanistan 
by the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups aligned with 
the United States in its fight against the Taliban, and he ended up a 
prisoner of the United States.  He was labeled an enemy combatant 
based on his alleged training with the Taliban, service in a Taliban 
unit which continued after September 11, 2001, and possession of an 
assault rifle while in the field with his Taliban unit.80  The Supreme 
Court ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings designed 
to provide Hamdi an opportunity, in compliance with due process 
requirements, to dispute the government’s allegations.  Even before 
reaching the due process issues, the Court needed to decide if holding 
Hamdi in the first place violated a statute that provides that no citizen 
may be imprisoned or detained by the United States “except pursuant 
to an Act of Congress.”81  The Court divided 5-4 on that issue, with 
the majority holding that the detention of enemy combatants is an 
incident of waging war, since it serves the purpose of preventing those 
who have been captured from returning to the field and taking up 
arms again.82 
United States armed forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
as ordered into battle by the President pursuant to the authority given 
him by the AUMF, unquestionably had the right to capture and hold 
enemy fighters.  It turned out that Hamdi was a citizen of the United 
States, but there “is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own 
citizens as an enemy combatant.”83  The disposition of Hamdi 
provides scant support for the proposition that the AUMF is a statute 
authorizing warrantless surveillance that is otherwise prohibited by 
FISA.  The 1971 statute on which Hamdi relied was designed to guard 
against a repetition of the type of mass internment such as that 
 
79.  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
80. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13 (plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor).  The gov-
ernment’s allegations on these points were supported by a declaration of Michael Mobbs, 
an official of the Department of Defense. 
81.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (O’Connor, J.) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)). 
82.  Id. at 518 (O’Connor, J.).  The four Justices joining in Justice O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion were joined, on this issue, by Justice Thomas.  Id. at 579, 586-87. 
83. Id. at 519 (O’Connor, J.).  The plurality noted that one of the Nazi saboteurs 
claimed to be a citizen of the United States.  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942). 
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imposed on those of Japanese descent during World War II.84  The 
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the statute should be 
allowed to deprive the President of one of the core aspects of 
successfully fighting an enemy – preventing captured opponents from 
being allowed to return to the fight after being captured. 
FISA comprehensively and precisely regulates NSA efforts to 
intercept international communications of United States persons who 
are in the United States.  It states explicitly that warrantless electronic 
surveillance is illegal unless authorized by statute, yet at no time in 
the legislative process that led to the AUMF was there the slightest 
hint that the operation of FISA would in any way be affected.  One of 
the companion cases to Hamdi, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,85 had the 
potential to shed some light on whether the AUMF should be 
interpreted to limit earlier statutes having nothing to do with the 
combat operations conducted under authority of the AUMF.  Padilla, 
a citizen of the United States, had been taken into custody inside the 
United States, and held in military custody.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the government’s 
argument that the AUMF authorized this detention, but the Supreme 
Court held that Padilla’s habeas corpus petition had been filed in the 
wrong district.  When the case was refiled, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit upheld the government’s AUMF argument, but 
that case too was diverted when the United States transferred Padilla 
to civilian custody for trial rather than defending in the Supreme 
Court the holding that the AUMF granted authority for continued 
military detention. 
It would be extraordinary if the precisely-crafted FISA 
framework, which has been explicitly amended by Congress five times 
since 9/11,86 could silently be altered in the way that the 
Administration contends, particularly since the AUMF was adopted 
without there being any reference to NSA, to its mission, to the 
targeted interception of international communications of United 





84.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (O’Connor, J.). 
85.  542 U.S. 426 (2004).  The litigation was revived in the Fourth Circuit, and the 
Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari.  Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006), 
denying cert. in 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
86.  Feb. 6, 2006 Judiciary Committee Hearing (Sen. Leahy), supra note 78. 
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VI.  Recognition of the Fact That FISA Prohibits 
the Warrantless Surveillance Program 
Does Not Make FISA Unconstitutional 
 
Perhaps the most creative, but least well defined, arguments 
advanced in support of the warrantless surveillance program are 
those suggesting that if FISA prohibits the program the statute itself 
must be unconstitutional as an impairment of the President’s 
“inherent constitutional authority” under Article II of the 
Constitution.  The invocation of the President’s inherent 
constitutional authority has become something of a mantra for the 
Administration, and the felicitous phrase is repeated again and again, 
yet there are almost no developed principles of constitutional law that 
establish what those powers are or how they are affected by 
legislation passed by Congress.  The reference to “inherent” powers is 
itself somewhat misleading, since the arguments in support of the 
warrantless surveillance program are grounded in the text of the 
Constitution, especially the very first sentence in Article II, which 
vests the “executive Power” in the President, and the Commander-in-
Chief provision.  Of course, there are a number of other parts of the 
constitutional text that are not helpful in defending the program, and 
therefore are rarely cited by the Administration.  The President “shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”87 and Congress is 
granted broad legislative powers over the military, over commerce 
(which includes telecommunications), and over the public purse. 
The brass-knuckles argument vigorously advanced by the 
Administration is that if FISA prohibits NSA from the warrantless 
targeting of international communications of United States persons in 
the United States for interception, then the statute is 
unconstitutional.  There does not appear to be any precedent even 
vaguely on point – that is, where Congress legislated in an area within 
its legislative authority and it was nonetheless held by the Supreme 
Court that the President had inherent authority to act contrary to the 
statute.  The possibility that such a situation could arise cannot be 
dismissed altogether, since a statute that is unconstitutional may 
properly be declared void by the Supreme Court, but the White 
House in effect urges adoption of a new and entirely unprecedented 
principle that would declare unconstitutional all legislation that 
 
87.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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prevents the President from doing anything he considers useful in 
defending the country. 
The celebrated Steel Seizure Case88 is the precedent most nearly 
on point, and it offers no support at all for the proposition that FISA 
is unconstitutional if it in any way inhibits the President’s freedom of 
action as Commander in Chief.  In the midst of the bruising Korean 
War, President Truman feared that an impending nationwide strike in 
the steel industry would prevent the nation from producing the 
armaments needed to sustain the military.  Therefore, he ordered the 
Secretary of Commerce to take control of the steel mills in order to 
assure that production of the vital material would continue.  In that 
case, Congress had never passed a statute forbidding seizure of 
productive resources, although it had failed to pass legislation that 
would have granted the President the power to make such seizures.  
The President was no doubt sincere in his belief that a strike would 
seriously undermine the war effort, but the Supreme Court held the 
seizure unconstitutional. 
Perhaps most pertinently for present purposes, not only did the 
result in Steel Seizure go against the power claimed by the President, 
but the influential concurring opinion of Justice Jackson articulated a 
method for approaching situations in which the Executive’s actions 
deal with the same matters as those on which Congress could act.  
“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress 
can delegate.”89  That principle would be applicable if the AUMF 
authorized the warrantless surveillance program, but for the reasons 
discussed above that is a most improbable interpretation of the 
AUMF.  Justice Jackson’s second category, which addresses the 
situation where “the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority,”90 is not alleged by anyone 
to control the present controversy.  Justice Jackson’s third category, 
the one to which he consigned President Truman’s steel seizure itself, 
is this: 
 
When the President takes measures incompatible with 
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at 
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
 
88.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
89.  Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court). 
90.  Id. at 637 (Jackson, J.). 
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constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive 
Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the 
Congress from acting upon the subject.  Presidential 
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive 
must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is 
the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.91 
 
The President, Attorney General Gonzales, General Hayden, 
and others defending the warrantless surveillance program have 
repeatedly stated that the President considers the program a desirable 
and effective one that makes it easier for him to prosecute the fight 
against al Qaeda successfully.  However, even if those highly debated 
assertions are assumed to be true, they do not come close to 
establishing that the President’s Article II powers are being violated 
simply because the legislative choice made by Congress prevents him 
from acting in exactly the manner that he prefers.  Congress 
unquestionably has broad powers that are applicable, since it can 
regulate the interstate and foreign communications industry under 
the commerce clause, and also regulate the military.  Even Attorney 
General Gonzales has conceded as much: 
 
Well, the fact that the president . . . may have inherent 
authority doesn’t mean that Congress has no authority in 
a particular area.  And we look at the words of the 
Constitution and there are clear grants of authority to the 
Congress in time of war.  And so if you’re talking about 
competing constitutional interests, that’s when you get 
into sort of the third part of the Jackson analysis.92 
 
The claimed “inherent constitutional authority” that would 
permit a President to act contrary to a statute whenever he feels that 
it is necessary to do so in order to successfully prosecute a war, or to 
defend the country against attack or subversion from abroad, or to 
conduct the foreign relations of the United States, could not easily be 
cabined by any defensible limiting principle.  Perhaps seeing the need 
for there to be limits in order to make the theory more palatable, 
 
91.  Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J.) (footnote omitted). 
92.  Feb. 6, 2006 Judiciary Committee Hearing (afternoon session) (testimony of 
Attorney General Gonzales), supra note 78. 
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President Bush has stated that assassination would be impermissible: 
“I don’t think a president can order the assassination of a leader of 
another country with which we’re not at war.  There are clear red 
lines.”93  While assassination would be reprehensible, it is difficult to 
see why it would necessarily be illegal if the warrantless surveillance 
program is not.  FISA prohibits the surveillance program, but there is 
no statute that prohibits assassinations.94  Thus, for purposes of a Steel 
Seizure analysis along the lines suggested by Justice Jackson, 
assassination would not be in the third category (as the current FISA 
controversy is), but rather in one of the first two categories.  The 
Administration has placed great emphasis on intelligence collection 
as a traditional aspect of warfare and national defense, but surely 
assassination of enemy leaders and agents is similarly intertwined 
with the history of warfare and international conflict.  If the unformed 
constitutional theory advanced by the Administration were to be 
accepted, judicial supervision of its boundaries would be difficult if 
not impossible.  In practical terms, the President would have secured 
the “blank check” that the Hamdi Court withheld.95 
Application of the theory of claimed “inherent constitutional 
authority” to the facts of the warrantless surveillance program cannot 
proceed much further without a lot more information about the 
nature and implementation of the program.  However, I see no 
realistic possibility that the facts, once known, will lead to the 
conclusion that the President’s constitutional authority is being 
usurped.96  Since the Administration is claiming, in essence, that the 
President cannot function effectively as Commander in Chief without 
the ability to bypass the FISC on surveillance of certain international 
communications, it would need to make a detailed case that has not 
yet been made (at least in public) – that the need to get warrants in 
the situations covered by the program has a dramatic effect on his 
 
93.  Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Bush and His Senior Aides Press On in Legal 
Defense for Wiretapping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at A13. 
94.  After the Church Committee exposed CIA assassination plots, there was 
consideration of legislation to prohibit assassination.  “However, President Ford headed 
off such legislation by adopting” an executive order “prohibiting U.S. employees from 
engaging in ‘political assassination.’”  STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW 373 (3d ed. 2002).  The current prohibition remains part of an executive order rather 
than a statute.  See Executive Order 12,333, supra note 55, at § 2.11. 
95.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor) (“a state 
of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens”). 
96.  See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the statute that sub-
stantially restricted presidential ability to remove an independent counsel). 
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ability to perform as Commander in Chief.  If the case were made, 
there is no reason to predict that the potential constitutional collision 
between Article II and FISA, as predicted by the Administration, 
would actually take place.  Congress built a number of safety valves 
into FISA as originally written,97 and it has repeatedly amended the 
statute to meet the Administration’s concerns after 9/11.  Rather than 
identifying changes that it claims need to be made in FISA, either on 
constitutional or policy grounds, the Administration has chosen 
instead, in secret, to act contrary to the statute. 
Not enough is publicly known about the program to permit a full 
exploration of the constitutional assertions being made by the 
Administration.  There are dramatic inconsistencies pervading the 
various assertions being made about the program, and many of the 
most important facts have not yet been disclosed to the public.  One 
critical unknown is the size of the program.  The original New York 
Times article disclosing the existence of the program reported that 
officials familiar with it had said that NSA was eavesdropping on “up 
to 500 people in the United States at any given time.”98  More 
recently, Seymour Hersh wrote that a government consultant told 
him “that tens of thousands of Americans had had their calls 
monitored in one way or the other.”99  The magnitude of the program, 
 
97.  When Congress declares war, warrantless electronic surveillance is permitted for 
15 days.  50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).  In an emergency, electronic surveillance may be 
instituted immediately, so long as an application for a FISA warrant is filed within 72 
hours.  Id. at § 1805(f).  A major concern expressed by the Administration about the 72-
hour provision, in addition to its brevity and the fact that it is only available when the 
FISA probable cause standard is expected to be met, is that if emergency interception 
begins and no FISA warrant is issued, the target might then be notified.  Feb. 6, 2006 
Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 78 (afternoon session) (testimony of Attorney 
General Gonzales) (if an order is not obtained, “the presumption is that the judge will 
then notify the target of that surveillance during that 72-hour period”). 
98.  Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1; see Barton Gellman, Dafna Linzer & Carol D. 
Leonnig, Surveillance Net Yields Few Suspects; NSA’s Hunt for Terrorists Scrutinizes 
Thousands of Americans, but Most Are Later Cleared, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2006, at A1 
(“Two knowledgeable sources placed [the number of Americans who have had their 
conversations recorded or their e-mails read without warrants] in the thousands; one of 
them, more specific, said about 5,000.”). 
99.  Hersh, supra note 67, at 25.  The important ambiguity in the reported statement is 
whether the monitoring being described involves the contents of the communications, 
which implicates FISA, or whether only transactional information is being acquired.  See 
generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT 
AMENDMENTS (2006); Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional 
Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. 
& POL’Y 37 (2005). 
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which the Administration has so far refused to reveal, has significant 
implications for a number of the other arguments being advanced in 
support of the program. 
One recurrent theme advanced in support of the program is that 
the standard of “probable cause” being used by NSA in carrying out 
the program is the same standard as that used by the FISC.  If true, 
this assertion may help to blunt concerns being raised about entirely 
innocent individuals having their communications intercepted.100  
However, if the total number of United States persons being targeted 
in the United States has increased dramatically, that would strongly 
suggest that a lower standard of probable cause is being used.  The 
Administration has been careful in most instances to state that “a” 
probable cause standard is being used, often buttressed by a citation 
to the recent Supreme Court decision in Maryland v. Pringle101 that is 
designed to show that it does not take very much information to 
establish probable cause.102  It is far from clear that Pringle, properly 
understood, supports the low threshold of suspicion that the 
Administration claims is sufficient.  The case involved arrests made 
when three men all were in a car stopped for speeding at 3:15 a.m.  
The driver consented to a search of the vehicle, which led to the 
discovery of a roll of money and five baggies containing cocaine.  
None of the men would say who owned the drugs and the money, so 
the police arrested all three.  Pringle later admitted that the cocaine 
was his, but challenged the legality of the arrest.  The Court 
concluded that “there was probable cause to believe Pringle 
committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or 
jointly,” since “it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common 
enterprise among the three men.”103 
Although the government repeatedly cites Pringle as reflecting 
the appropriate standard of probable cause, one of the cases 
distinguished by the Supreme Court’s decision in Pringle may more 
closely resemble the circumstances of United States persons who 
 
100.  Even if the standards were established to be the same, the core concerns of the 
Fourth Amendment would remain a serious obstacle to upholding the legality of the 
program, since the critical determination on probable cause is made by an NSA employee 
rather than by a detached and neutral magistrate.  “The Fourth Amendment contemplates 
a prior judicial judgment.”  Keith, supra note 10, 407 U.S. at 317. 
101.  540 U.S. 366 (2003). 
102.  See, e.g., DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses 
to Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 30 (the “‘reasonable grounds to believe’ 
standard is a ‘probable cause’ standard of proof, see Maryland v. Pringle”). 
103.  Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372-73. 
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have some contact with an al Qaeda adherent without manifesting 
membership in or allegiance to the group.  In Ybarra v. Illinois,104 
police officers had obtained a search warrant authorizing them to 
search a tavern and its bartender for evidence of drugs.  The Court 
held that the warrant did not permit pat-down searches of the patrons 
who were in the bar at the time the warrant was executed, absent 
individualized suspicion.105  Thus, to the extent that the program 
targets United States persons based on ambiguous contacts with 
suspected al Qaeda members, it seems very likely that the standard of 
probable cause being applied is not as demanding as the one that 
would be applied by the FISC. 
The government has denied that it is changing the standard of 
probable cause, arguing that the principal reason for using FISA in 
the situations within the warrantless surveillance program is that 
“pursuing ‘prior judicial review by the FISA court’ requires 
significantly more time.”106  However, in establishing internal 
procedures and in allocating resources, the Justice Department and 
other agencies can exert substantial influence on the speed of the 
FISA process.  Even if administrative changes need to be made in 
order to allow FISA warrants to be obtained more quickly in some 
cases, it hardly seems likely that such inconveniences could amount to 
an intrusion into the President’s sphere sufficient to allow him to 
triumph in a “category three” case.  Justice Jackson’s formulation 
places presidential power at its lowest ebb when the President acts in 
violation of a statute.  Given that over 2,000 FISA warrants were 
granted last year,107 it could not possibly be the case that the need to 
get another 500 – or even another 1,000 – would be a difficulty of 
constitutional dimension, even if expedition were needed in some 
instances.  Admittedly, there might be a serious problem if the need 
arose to get 10,000 warrants a year, but that would provide irrefutable 
proof that the probable cause standard being applied had been 
substantially diluted from that used by the FISC.  Moreover, 
Congress has shown itself quite willing to give prompt and 
sympathetic consideration to any proposed FISA modifications that 
are shown to be necessary, but the Administration has spurned those 
overtures. 
 
104.  444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
105.  Id. at 92-93. 
106. DOJ Responses to House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, Responses to 
Questions from Chairman Sensenbrenner, at 14; see id. at 38-39. 
107.  See supra note 27. 
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The Administration has been very successful so far in 
withholding from the public the details of the warrantless surveillance 
program, making a precise assessment of its legality very difficult to 
carry out.  However, it appears that the core violation being 
committed is the targeting of international calls involving United 
States persons in the United States who appear to have had at least 
some contact with someone connected to al Qaeda, but where it is 
uncertain that the FISC would find that there is probable cause to 
believe that the potential target is an agent of a foreign power. 
FISA plainly requires a warrant in the situations described.  The 
AUMF cannot plausibly be taken to have provided statutory 
authorization for warrantless interceptions under these 
circumstances.  Moreover, the “inherent constitutional authority” 
theory advanced by the Administration flies in the face of the classic 
Steel Seizure formula of Justice Jackson that places the President’s 
power at its lowest ebb when he acts contrary to a statute.  If a 
President is permitted to violate a comprehensive and long-standing 
statutory system, without even seeking to obtain desired adjustments 
from Congress, our system of separation of powers will be altered in 
ways that are both radical and undesirable. 
 
 
